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Abstract—Flexible electricity networks continuously co-
ordinate and optimize operations through ICT systems.
An overlay data grid conveys information about the state
of the electricity grid, as well as the status of demand and
production of electricity in households and industry. Data
is thus the basis for decisions that affect electricity costs
and availability of assets on the electricity grid. It is crucial
that these decisions are formed and monitored according to
a well-defined governance model. No such data governance
model exist today. In this paper, we focus on the central
role of virtual power plants in flexible electricity networks.
We define the problem of data governance in a virtual
power plant, insisting on the issues linked to the inherent
asymmetry of this system. We propose unionization as a
framing device to reason about this issue. The central
contribution of this paper is thus principles for a unionized
data governance model for virtual power plants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity networks have become pivotal in our so-
cieties attempt to decrease the emission of greenhouse
gasses. Flexible electricity networks must constantly
mediate the tension between the demand-agnostic pro-
duction of electricity from renewable sources and the
supplier-agnostic consumption we have been accustomed
to. Flexible electricity networks continuously coordinate
and optimize operations through ICT systems. An over-
lay data grid conveys information about the state of the
electricity grid, as well as the status of demand and
production of electricity in households and industry. Data
is thus the basis for decisions that affect electricity costs
and availability of assets on the electricity grid. It is
crucial that these decisions are formed and monitored
according to a well-defined governance model. No such
data governance model exists today. They are the topic
of this paper.
We focus on the role of ”Virtual Power Plants”. Briefly
for now, a virtual power plant, or VPP, organizes the
flows of data between many asset owners (individuals or
companies) and an aggregator that takes decisions about
tariffs and asset availability. Since VPPs are a proposed
way to integrate renewable energy sources and decrease
the reliance on fossil fuels, they, simply by their func-
tion, inherit an aura of progressiveness, sustainability
and collaboration. But the powerful position they hold,
collecting sensitive personal data about individuals and
remotely controlling assets in their households, opens
many possibilities for exploitation. These must be coun-
teracted by a strong governance model.
In this paper, we explore the issues around governance
of the data that flows from individuals to aggregator
within a VPP. We introduce the frame of unionization as
a way to address these issues, and discuss how unions
can be incorporated into data governance models to
increase transparency, accountability and trust.
In Section II, we detail the role of virtual power plants
in flexible electricity networks. Section III defines the
problem in terms of data sources and data flows within
the system. In Section IV, we introduce the frame of
unionization as a way to address these problems, and
Section V describes the principles for data governance
derived from this frame. Section VI presents selected
work that we find relevant for this issue, and Section
VII summarizes the findings of the paper.
II. VIRTUAL POWER PLANTS
In this section we introduce the concept of Virtual
Power Plants. We describe the motivation for flexibility
in electrical networks, the inherently asymmetrical struc-
ture of VPPs, and the issues surrounding personal data
collection.
A. The Need for Flexibility
Many energy-intensive sectors, including transporta-
tion and heating, are increasingly moving towards elec-
trification. But the green promise of electrification can
only be kept if the electrons flowing in our grids are
from low-emission renewable energy sources. And while
renewable generation capacity is growing, this is in itself
not sufficient.
Renewable energy sources — such as wind, solar and
tidal — are non-dispatchable, meaning that we cannot
control their production. We can turn generators off,
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2but we cannot generate electricity from these sources
at will. The conditions of our environment must allow
it. Sometimes, the wind is not blowing, the sun is not
shining and the tidal currents are still. But our con-
sumption of electricity continues regardless. This creates
large gaps in time between production and load, which
is an issue as there is currently no viable solutions for
large-scale energy storage.1 The electrical grid operators
constantly balance the production and the consumption
of energy in order to maintain a stable grid. So even
if we generate enough renewable energy to match our
demand on average, the need to balance consumption
and non-dispatchable generation on a minute-to-minute
basis is an on-going problem.
A proposed way to balance a grid with a large amount
of non-dispatchable generation is to incorporate demand-
side flexibility [1]. The load on the grid is constrained due
to physical limits of the infrastructure, so flexibility, or
supply-following load, eases this constraint by managing
the electrical demand – making demand dispatchable to
balance the uneven renewable generation and its storage.
Temporary energy storage and other types of dynamic
demand response are crucial to managing renewable
energy flexibly on the grid.
But in order to achieve this flexibility, the future
electricity networks, as envisioned by especially [2]
and [3], will need to be digitally networked electrical
grids that continuously coordinate and optimize opera-
tion through ICT systems (see also [4]–[7]). This data
infrastructure is a layer on top of the electrical grid,
transporting information about the state of both industrial
and domestic demand and generation. It organizes flows
of data concerning home and individual energy use.
These flows of data can be used to make decisions on
how to balance the grid or on how to store electricity:
Data is Electricity!
The data infrastructure associated with the electricity
system relies on personal data. For example, home usage
data in a 1-hour resolution can disclose whether you are
home [8], and sub-second resolution can reveal which
movies you are watching [9]. Data governance is essen-
tial to manage the impact of such data infrastructures on
society.
A proposed component of this flexibly-managed smart
grid, is what has popularly been coined Virtual Power
Plants2 (VPPs). A VPP provides flexibility by aggre-
gating a host of smaller distributed energy resources
(DERs) — such as solar panels, domestic batteries,
1 Pumped-storage hydroelectricity is the primary large-scale energy
storage solution, but it needs specific natural features (such as
reservoirs) to be applicable.
2 First proposed in [10] as ”virtual utilities”
electric vehicles or electric heating systems — using
their combined capacity to provide services normally
reserved for industrial scale power plants.
B. VPP Asymmetry
The idea of VPPs is an emerging concept that has
yet to see complete consensus on its definition. In [11]
a literature review is carried out which identified a
convergence towards the following definition: ”A VPP
is a virtual entity involving multiple stakeholders and
comprising decentralized multi-site heterogeneous tech-
nologies, formed by aggregating dispatchable and non
dispatchable distributed energy sources and energy stor-
age systems, including electric vehicles and controllable
loads. It is supported by information and communication
technology to form the equivalent of a single virtual
power plant with capacity to manage and coordinate its
operations, ensuring power and information flow among
its stakeholders in order to minimize generation costs,
maximize profits, and enhance participation in demand
response programs as well as trade within the electricity
market.” [11, p. 281]
The subset of VPPs of interest for this paper, are those
in which the DERs, or assets, are owned by individuals
outside the organization that owns the VPP. The VPP
as a concept includes all of the stakeholders, but we
are particularly interested in relationship between the
asset-owners and the aggregator. An asset-owner is a
stakeholder that owns an individual asset in the portfolio
of the aggregator. An example is a homeowner with a
heat pump, electric car or domestic battery that can be
remotely controlled. The aggregator3 is the stakeholder
controlling the ICT system that collects data and controls
the assets. The relationship between asset, aggregator
and VPP is shown in Figure 1.
C. VPPs and Personal Data
The ICT system at the core of the VPP is dependent
on several data flows in order to function. The most
interesting and complex from a governance perspective
is the flow from asset-owner to aggregator. This data
flow contains electricity consumption information from
the home (and potentially electric car), which is highly
personal data. Behavior patterns can be inferred from
electricity consumption, and the data acts as the basis
for decisions made about the control of the asset, which
influences both power cost and availability for the asset-
owner. Because of the nature and purpose of this data,
3 The term ”aggregator” is sometimes used as a synonym for VPP,
which is again a sign that the dust has not completely settled around
the terminology in this field.
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Fig. 1. Overall structure of a VPP. The aggregator controls a portfolio of assets — such as heat pumps, domestic batteries or EVs — and
participates in the energy market or provides flexibility services to power systems operators.
the data governance model employed within the VPP
is crucial for the development of trust between asset-
owners and aggregator.
In a demonstration project conducted as part of the
Danish ECOGRID 2.0-project [12], an aggregator was
implemented, controlling heat pumps in 300 private
households over the course of 3 years [13]. This ag-
gregator remotely sent throttling commands to the heat
pumps, decreasing load on the grid at certain times. The
aggregator collected individual electricity consumption
measurements every 5 minutes, and used it as input to
its model along with weather service data. In the context
of ECOGRID 2.0 the homeowners were found to have a
high degree of trust in the project, attributed in part to
the technicians from the local community-owned utility,
who installed and serviced the connected heat pumps
[14].
The mass use of internet-connected services and de-
vices that collect and store data of our use and behaviors
have led to a continuous and pervasive monitoring of our
lived lives. This data collection is generally not approved
by the users, who find the data collection ”creepy” [15].
Still, despite regular public outcries, people continue
to use the services, handing over their data. This has
typically been described as an expression of the so-
called ”privacy paradox” [16], [17], which describes the
discrepancy between intentions and behaviors when it
comes to personal information disclosure.
Recent research suggest that this ”paradox” represents
wide-spread ”digital resignation” [18]: People desire to
control their personal information, but feel unable to do
so, rendering them passive. A study on data leakage in
mobile apps conducted in [15] indicated that people were
opposed to this practice of data collection, but could see
no alternative except to stop using the smartphone as a
smartphone altogether. The organizations collecting data
benefit from this resignation, cultivating it through ob-
fuscation measures, such as complicated privacy policies
and transparency initiatives that allows partial access but
not control [18].
What differentiates the case of VPPs from data col-
lection through mobile apps is in part the novelty of the
domain. Continuos monitoring of electrical consumption
is a new type of surveillance in a primary private sphere,
the home, and unlike the phones and smart speakers we
bring into the home ourselves, this monitoring becomes
part of the infrastructure that makes the house. Finally,
the aggregator has direct control of the home, controlling
electricity availability and cost. The aggregator is not just
sensing, but also actuating.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A VPP can be viewed as a system that collects data
from various sources and combines these in order to
make decisions about the behavior of its assets and,
by consequence, the lives of the asset-owners. In order
4to define the problem of data governance between the
asset-owners and aggregator, we must first define the
different types of data sources and flows within the
system. From these we identify the relationships that
these flows represent, and the problems to address.
A. Data Sources
For an aggregator to function within a VPP, the
minimum data needed is the current status of the assets.
In addition to this, the aggregator needs the privileges
to remotely control the assets, which is tightly coupled
to data access. Status data from a single asset, such as
battery charge level or heat pump temperature, becomes
richer when collected over time, and can be used to
model the behavior of residents. These models can
estimate when assets are idle or homes are vacant, which
is highly relevant information for a VPP. But the richness
of this data also makes it valuable for many purposes
outside the scope of a VPP, such as profiling with the
purpose of targeting or manipulation.
Data from assets alone does not allow for much
meaningful decision-making. The crucial property of
VPPs is the ability to optimize for outside parameters.
For commercial aggregators, this data might come from
electricity markets, detailing the market prices of elec-
tricity now or in the future, allowing the aggregator to
optimize for price and profit by buying power in bulk
when it is cheap (e.g [19], [20]). Or it might come from
DSOs, detailing bids for flexibility services in certain
parts of the grid. For VPPs where profit is not the only
goal, other relevant data sources might be the current
generation of renewable energy, if the goal is to increase
utilization of renewable energy, or the weather, if the
goal is to stock up on energy in preparation for cold or
extreme weather.
B. Data Flows
The data created at each source flows to the aggregator
to be used in its decision engine, deciding where to
increase or decrease electricity consumption. We can
distinguish between two discrete types of data flows:
The core flows, data which flows from the assets to the
aggregator, and the supplementary flows, which is data
from external sources used in the optimization algorithm
of the aggregator (see Figure 2).
1) Core Flows: The core flows are the basis of the
capabilities of the VPP, carrying the current status, and
thereby potential, of the portfolio. Each of the core flows
represent the relationship between an organization (the
aggregator) and an individual (the asset-owner). The core
flows are numerous, a one-to-many relationship, and
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Fig. 2. Data flows to the aggregator. The upper part represents the
assets in the aggregators portfolio, while the lower part represents
the data sources on which the aggregator bases its decisions.
each of the core flows are in practice interchangeable.
The aggregator simply needs enough capacity, it is less
important exactly which assets that capacity is comprised
of. If a core flow is discontinued or unavailable, the VPP
can either continue with slightly decreased capacity or
replace the flow with a similar asset.
2) Supplementary Flows: The supplementary flows
are the basis of the direction of the VPP, carrying the
current outside parameters that are used when optimizing
for system goals. The supplementary data flows have
the characteristic in common that they are between two
organizations. They are one-to-one relationships that are
not interchangeable. Each supplementary flow contains
data to be used in the optimization loop of the aggre-
gators decision engine. If a supplementary data flow is
discontinued or unavailable, the VPP might not be able
to make decisions, rendering it idle.
Both the two categories of data flows, the core and
supplementary flows, are necessary for the VPP to func-
tion. But due to the interchangeability, the individual
core flow is of lower importance than the individual
supplementary flow.
C. Vulnerability and Conflicting Goals
The nature of these data flows creates an asymmetrical
power relation between the aggregator and the asset-
owner. The aggregator has control over the electricity
cost and availability for the asset-owners and access to
5valuable and personal data about them. This makes issues
around data governance — how the data is used in the
decision engine of the aggregator, and to what degree
the personal data is analyzed and shared — important
to the asset-owners. Simultaneously, the asset-owner is
in a poor position to make demands or bargain with
the aggregator, as the single data flow the asset-owner
represents is not critical to the function of the VPP. Each
individual asset-owner has very limited leverage in such
a negotiation.
This becomes an issue when the aggregator and asset-
owners have conflicting goals. The workings of a system
such as a VPP are a manifestation of its function or pur-
pose [21], to borrow terms from systems theory, which
can be seen as the high-level direction of the system.
This direction is shaped by the structural properties of
the system, the context it is placed in, and the goals
of the stakeholders. Goals in this context represents
properties of the desired direction of the system, and
are unique for each stakeholder. Examples of goals for
a VPP include maximizing profits, lowering prices for
end-consumers, ensuring grid stability or transitioning to
renewable energy. The goals of a stakeholder are often
not explicitly stated and their internal compatibilities are
complex. Goals A and B can be said to be ”conflicting”
if adjusting the direction of the system to address A
negatively impacts B.
For example, the aggregator presumably has a goal of
maximizing profits, and the asset-owners have a goal of
preserving the integrity of their personal sphere. Given
the issue of selling data about the behavior of asset-
owners to third parties, these two goals are in conflict.
However, the decision about whether to sell the data or
not, is placed with the aggregator.
If an asset-owner wishes to alter the direction of the
VPP, they are in a precarious position to do so. This is
due to the asymmetry of political power and leverage,
and the consequence of such a conflict: If the asset-owner
stops the cooperation with an aggregator, the asset-owner
loses all of the perks of the service, while the aggregator
only loses a fraction of its capacity.
It is this governance question, of how the asset-owners
can influence the way their data is being utilized in a
system where their leverage is limited, that is addressed
in this paper.
IV. THE UNIONIZATION FRAME
In this section we present the problem in the frame
of unionization, inspired by the consensus-seeking trade
unions of Northern Europe. From this context we derive
principles for data governance in the context of VPPs.
A. Managing Power Asymmetries Through Unions
The core data flows of a VPP can be seen as analogous
to the relations of employment in classical capitalism,
where the production is contingent on the pooling of a
significant amount of labor. This labor is secured through
individual contracts (or simply day-wages, meaning no
contracts at all), which leaves the worker in an asym-
metrical power relation to the employer similar to the
relationship described in subsection III-C.
The primary ways of addressing the asymmetry be-
tween worker and employer has been government reg-
ulations and the forming of trade unions. Trade unions
mediate the flow of labor from workers to employer, and
through this mediation gain leverage when negotiating
wages and conditions. This is what is known as collective
bargaining. Should the employer refuse to meet the
demands of the trade union representing the workers,
they can invoke a strike, removing the employers access
to labor and thereby halting production.
In a more general sense, unions can be seen as aggre-
gators of power. Whether in relation to labour, consumer
rights, student conditions, or a host of other domains,
the fundamental concept remains: By organizing, the
interchangeability and replaceability of the individual
relation is countered by collective action.
The main concepts from traditional trade unions can
be used within a VPP as a way to obtain leverage and
negotiating power in the relationship between aggregator
and asset-owner. We propose the creation of a new
institutional actor - the data union, which individual asset
owners can join. The data union has clearly articulated
and defined goals and mediates on behalf of the asset
owners, controlling all (or a significant amount of) the
core data flows. This allows for collective bargaining, by
using the possibility of halting or limiting the core flow
(a ”strike”) as leverage. The structure of unionized data
flows is shown in Figure 3.
This mediation can be implemented in various ways,
offering the union different degrees of power. The union
could act like a traditional trade union, bargaining con-
tract conditions on behalf on its members and, in case
of a conflict, encouraging members to stop the data flow
to the aggregator by turning of the connectivity of their
collective assets. Since this union is interacting with an
ICT system, there is also the possibility for much more
direct and dynamic involvement of the union in the data
flows. This could either be done by granting the union
control over the assets in a way that trumps the aggrega-
tor, allowing them to dynamically start and stop the core
flow. Alternatively the data flows could be rerouted to
go through union-controlled infrastructure before being
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Fig. 3. Unionized data flows to the aggregator. The core flows, the
data from the assets, flows though a node of union-controlled infras-
tructure, allowing for leverage in negotiations with the aggregators
forwarded to the aggregator, creating a single point of
control between the union and the aggregator.
If the union chooses to physically route the data
through union-controlled infrastructure, this allows for a
wider range of possibilities for control of data usage. One
such possibility is anonymization through continuous
de-identification. An aggregator needs to know which
resources are available, but it does not strictly need to
know which asset belongs to which asset-owner. By
rehashing the identifiers of asset-owners at set intervals
in time, the union can limit the aggregators ability
to reason about the individual asset-owners behavioral
patterns, while still allowing them access to all resource
information. Controlling infrastructure also allows the
union to construct a valuable dataset from which more
general patterns and information can be deduced, some-
thing that has otherwise only been the privilege of the
aggregator.
B. Organizing Communities
Traditionally, trade unions have been organized around
fairly coherent occupational groups, whose members
had similar conditions, experiences and demands as a
base for organization. However, the diversification and
specialization of the workforce have coincided with a
great decline in union membership and power through
the 1980s and 90s [22]–[25].
One way to address these issues has been to organize
unions around ”place-based communities” other than the
workplace, which can be seen by unions advocating for
change on a social and political level that goes beyond
worker self-interest [26]. As described in [27], early
trade unions were anchored in the local community, and
[28] argues that a return to local community unions is
”at the heart of union renewal strategies”.
This harmonizes with the idea of a VPP data union.
In contrast to many other asymmetrical relations of in-
formation, which can be highly globalized and detached
from the physical spaces occupied by its users, VPPs
are necessarily concentrated within a common locality,
determined by the topology of the electrical grid. A VPP
must have a significant amount of capacity in an area to
offer services to the DSOs and compete on the local
energy market. This means that the asset-owners have
in common a relationship to that area, and the localized
community could provide an arena to organize in.
Clearly, the hard borders of the grid topology will not
reflect the fluid and dynamic borders of local communi-
ties, but the common relationship and frame of reference
of the asset-owners, that the locality provides, can serve
as the basis for the construction of a new community
centered around electricity- and data-based issues. The
data union would be a key part of this community.
C. Enabling Productive Conflicts
Conflicts between stakeholders can be seen as a
steering mechanism for a system, altering its direction
according to the goals of those involved. But in order
for this mechanism to work, these conflicts have to be
productive. And to enable productive conflicts, each side
must acknowledge the power of the other. This creates
an even foundation for the negotiations surrounding the
conflict, taking into account the goals and interests of
both sides.
By unionizing, the asset-owners can force the ag-
gregator to acknowledge their power, leveraging their
ability for collective action. This can be done by halting
or manipulating the flows of data or electricity to and
from the assets. And while these collective actions are
not without costs for the asset-owners, the mere ability
to disrupt the functionality of the aggregator increases
leverage.
V. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
We have presented the issue of power asymmetry and
exploitation within a VPP in the frame of unionization,
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and now precede to describe which principles for data
governance that can be derived from this frame.
To describe data governance models in general terms,
we use the framework proposed by Khatri & Brown,
[29]4 partitioning the issues of governance into five
decision domains: data principles, data quality, meta-
data, data access and data lifecycle. These domains
influence each other, with the data principles informing
the decisions and models in the remaining four domains.
This relationship is visualized in Figure 4.
A. Unionization of Data Subjects
The basis for the following data governance principles,
is the constitution of a data union that mediates the goals
of the asset-owners.
By creating a union the asset-owners can engage in
collective bargaining with the aggregator, negotiating the
terms of the service that collects and processes informa-
tion about their lives. The union replaces the one-to-
many aggregator-to-asset-owner relationship with a one-
to-one aggregator-to-union relationship. This gives the
aggregator a single point of contact with the unionized
asset-owners, and constitutes a single point of leverage,
allowing asset-owners to make demands of the aggrega-
tor.
B. Data Principles and Representation
The decision domain of data principles is concerned
with ”clarifying the role of data as an asset”, its uses and
purposes, and the communication of its uses. In other
words, this is where the direction of all other decisions
surrounding data governance is made. In the case of
VPPs this includes whether selling or sharing data with
third parties is part of the business model, whether
modeling the behavior of individual assets should be
4 Adapted from the IT governance model presented in [30]
allowed, which supplementary data sources the decision
engine should be based on, and so on.
These principles should define a clear business owner
of data assets, and a governing body should be consti-
tuted to oversee the approvement and enforcement of
data usage in the context of the defined purpose and
direction. One example of such a governing body is
an ”Enterprise Data Committee”. A committee of this
sort would be an obvious place for union representation,
allowing the interests and values of the asset-owners to
be heard when discussing and reviewing data usage. It
would provide an organizational frame where the union
can impact the direction of the VPP by leveraging its
control of the core data flow.
C. Disruptive Measures for Asserting Power
The data governance model should include concrete
methods that allow for the asset-owners to disrupt the
functioning of the VPP, if the current data usage does
not live up to their demands. This could be done by
limiting or halting the core flow of data, the VPPs basis
for operation, thereby putting pressure on the aggregator
to respond to their demands.
These measures are intended as a last resort, as none
of the stakeholders are interested in a purely idle VPP.
But its existence is important to establish the fact that the
goals and demands of the asset-owners should be taken
into account, in order to avoid damaging consequences
for the aggregator.
This is in line with the Danish model for collective
bargaining, where measures are taken to avoid disruptive
conflicts such as a strike. This tradition is based on
extensive negotiations towards a reconciliation that is
acceptable to all parties. Only if the parties are unable to
resolve the conflict, with government-assisted mediation,
a strike is allowed. Still, these negotiations are always
based on the fact that a strike is possible.
D. Accountability Needs Transparency
Khatri & Brown describe the ”locus of accountability
of decision making” in a decision domain to denote those
held accountable if the handling of data does not live up
to the data governance model. But before we can hold
anybody accountable, we need to be able to assert that
something has gone wrong.
The aggregator and asset-owners might have conflict-
ing goals, but the aggregator is responsible for the major-
ity of the data collection, storage, processing, and usage.
This means that the aggregator does not necessarily have
an interest in divulging information about actions that
8diverges from the data principles. Therefore the asset-
owners must implement measures to ensure a high degree
of transparency, enabling them to audit the actions of the
aggregator.
From this we can see that transparency and auditing
procedures around the implementation of the use of the
data asset is crucial when designing a data governance
model for VPPs.
VI. RELATED WORK
We present a couple of selected related works that
offer other perspectives on similar or related issues of
data and governance. We present the notion of ”data
commons”, derived from commons theory, and ”SHIFT”,
a future design project that addresses the asymmetrical
relations of information within an existing trade union.
A. Data Commons
Drawing on commons theory from the field of eco-
nomic governance (e.g. [31]), the frame of ”data com-
mons” seeks to describe the accumulated data of users
as a common pool resource (CPR).
The main issue addressed in commons theory is how
to ensure sustainable governance of a CPR that is rival-
rous, meaning that its use by one precludes its use by
another, and where the locally optimal strategies for the
individual agents leads to a suboptimal strategy when
combined. A key example is fisheries, with the CPR
being the stock of fish in the sea: Each fisher benefits
more, in the short term, by catching as much as possible,
but the combination of each fisher pursuing this strategy
results in overfishing and eventual depletion and erosion
of the CPR.5
Data is unlike the traditional environmental CPRs,
as it does not directly erode with overuse. Data can
be copied and copied without loss. However, data and
knowledge can be seen as rivalrous if value is not strictly
measured as monetary worth, but instead described along
three dimensions: economic, sociological and identity (as
described in [33]). These dimensions become intuitively
clearer if we think of sustainability as responsibility:
Irresponsible management is not confined to actions that
diminish economic value, but also actions that affect
sociological structures in a negative way or is at odds
with the identities of the stakeholders. The primary
solution to CPR issues is the creation of a locally
5 While often called the ”tragedy of the commons”, it is worth
noting that more recent studies show how, in practice, it is not a
preordained tragedy, but much richer, more ambiguous, what [32]
describe as a ”drama of the commons”.
anchored stewardship role that oversees the usage of the
resource.
A significant amount of work has been done apply-
ing commons theory to the non-depletable resources of
knowledge and information (e.g. [34], [35]). In regard
to data governance and commons theory, most research
has been into the field of health care data (e.g. [36]–[38])
and ”smart cities” (e.g. [39]).
B. SHIFT - A Platform Union
In this paper, we have been looking at the unionization
of data creation. The SHIFT project [40] is a future
design project that takes the reverse approach. Based
around OPR, the union of russian truck drivers, the
SHIFT project proposes a strategic roadmap for the
union, aiming to secure the living conditions of truckers
as the development of automated solutions (”self-driving
trucks”) threatens to render them without employment.
To combat this threat, SHIFT plans to equip the
trucks of their members with sensors (camera, GPS,
accelerometer) and collect data from these in order to
create a dataset that would be of great value when
developing these automated solutions. The goal of this
is to either use the dataset as leverage when bargaining
with employers, or to simply circumvent the employers
completely and use the dataset to develop union-owned
automation, retrofitting the trucks of their members with
autopilot systems, turning the union into a logistics
company.
While speculative, this project has interesting parallels
to the problem discussed in this paper, the primary being
that the users own the assets, in this case the trucks. This
gives them freedom to create, terminate, and redirect data
flows to and from those assets. The strategic roadmap
also includes the consolidation of the union through
a digital platform, allowing for a sense of community
despite the extremely distributed nature of truck driving.
A similar solution might also be beneficiary in a VPP
context for asset-owners to discuss internal issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article we have presented the frame of union-
ization, inspired by trade unions, as a way to describe
the inherent problem of asymmetric relations of informa-
tion in VPPs and its consequences for data governance
models. We model the flows of data within a VPP as
the core data flows from assets to the aggregator, and
the supplementary data flows from external sources. The
core flows are necessary for the VPP to function, while
the supplementary flows provide context based on which
the aggregator makes decisions.
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For the aggregator, the individual assets are expend-
able and interchangeable, as long as the capacity is
sufficient, much like a classical employer-worker rela-
tionship. By forming a union, the individual asset-owners
are able to leverage their combined control over the
assets to influence the data flow, processing and storage
within the VPP.
From this frame we have derived a set of principles
for data governance models within VPPs:
Collective bargaining The asset-owners should be able
to bargain collectively about the conditions and
purposes of the data flows. This includes which
supplementary data flows to include and how to
utilize them.
Representation The asset-owners should be represented
in a central organizational governing body, which
is in charge of defining and overseeing the data
principles.
Disruptive measures The asset-owners should be able
to limit or halt core data flow, allowing them to
assert power and symmetry in the relation with the
aggregator.
Accountability Transparency measures should be put in
place to ensure the asset-owners ability to audit the
data usage performed by the aggregator, in order to
detect misuse and assign accountability
Finally we have presented the issue in relation to data-
oriented trade unions and the idea of ”data commons”,
which both have similar traits to the data flows within
VPPs.
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